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Abstract
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 led to a global financial crisis. Leaders of the G-7
countries agreed on October 10, 2008, to five principles for addressing the crisis, including
the need for sound deposit insurance. On October 12, Australia’s prime minister announced
a deposit insurance program that his government had first publicly vetted in June.
Anticipating Australia’s announcement, New Zealand’s prime minister announced its own
deposit guarantee scheme on the same afternoon. The government launched the Crown
Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme (the Scheme) “to ensure ongoing retail depositor
confidence in New Zealand’s financial system, given turbulence in the international financial
system.” To do this, the Treasury said it would provide an unlimited guarantee of all retail
deposits of eligible institutions; on October 22, it set a cap of 1 million New Zealand dollars
(NZD; about USD 600,000) per depositor. Unlike Australia’s scheme and most other deposit
schemes introduced during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), New Zealand’s guarantee
covered deposits in finance companies and holdings in some types of collective investment
schemes. Unlike Australia’s program and most others, it was not mandatory; institutions
could opt in, and all eligible institutions did so. The Scheme was intended to last two years,
until October 12, 2010. However, the government ultimately extended the Scheme until
December 31, 2011. When the Scheme was extended, fees shifted from a flat rate to riskbased rates. During its operation, nine nonbank financial institutions failed. The Scheme paid
NZD 1.9 billion in claims. It ultimately paid out 100% of deposits to all depositors of failed
institutions, despite the NZD 1 million cap, because of the administrative challenge of
identifying depositors under the cap. The Scheme collected NZD 1.1 billion from
receiverships and NZD 237 million in fees. New Zealand has not reinstated deposit insurance
since the Scheme expired.
Keywords: account guarantees, Crown Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme, Global Financial
Crisis, New Zealand

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering account guarantee programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Overview
In 2008, following the failure of Lehman
Brothers, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)
spread across the world. Leaders of the G-7
countries agreed on October 10, 2008, to
five principles for addressing the crisis,
including the need for sound deposit
insurance (Group of Seven 2008). New
Zealand, which had no deposit insurance at
the time, announced a deposit insurance
scheme on October 12, 2008 (Clark 2008).
It sought to reassure depositors and avoid
a flight of funds to Australia, whose
government announced a similar scheme
on the same afternoon (OAG 2011; Reserve
Bank 2008d). New Zealand officials,
however, misunderstood the terms of
Australia’s guarantee. New Zealand
authorities believed that Australia’s
guarantee would cover nonbank financial
institutions as a “full guarantee” (Dann
2018). The Australian guarantee did not
cover these institutions.
The Treasury established the Crown Retail
Deposit Guarantee Scheme (the Scheme)
under the Public Finance Act of 1989
(Reserve Bank 2008d; Public Finance Act
1989, sec. 65ZD). The Scheme had to be
rolled out quickly “to ensure ongoing retail
depositor confidence in New Zealand’s
financial system, given turbulence in the
international financial system” (Treasury
2009a). To do this, the Treasury
guaranteed all retail deposits of eligible
institutions and holdings in some types of
collective investment schemes (Reserve
Bank 2008d). By doing so, the Treasury and
the Reserve Bank hoped to forestall bank
runs that would have increased “the
difficulties faced by New Zealand financial
institutions and the broader economy”
(OAG 2011). The government originally
said that the guarantee was unlimited, but
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Key Terms
Purpose: To “ensure ongoing retail depositor
confidence in New Zealand’s financial system, given
turbulence in the international financial system”
Launch Dates

Announcement: Oct. 12, 2008
Authorization: Oct. 12, 2008
Operation: Oct. 12, 2008

End Dates

Originally, Oct. 12, 2010; later
extended to Dec. 31, 2011

Eligible
Institutions

New Zealand–registered banks
and nonbank deposit-taking
financial institutions

Eligible Account(s)

All deposits for registered
banks and some types of
collective investment scheme.
For nonbank deposit-taking
institutions, the Scheme
covered only the deposits of
New Zealand citizens and tax
residents

Fees

Originally, 10 basis points on
retail deposits over NZD 5
billion; later, fees were riskbased

Size of Guarantee

Originally unlimited, then set
at NZD 1 million on Oct. 22,
2008; lowered in 2010 to NZD
500,000 for bank deposits and
NZD 250,000 for others

Coverage

At its height, the Scheme
covered NZD 133 billion of
assets

Outcomes

Estimated NZD 1.9 billion in
claims due to nine failed
nonbank institutions; NZD 1.1
billion expected from
receivership; NZD 237 million
expected from fees
(continued)
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on October 22 announced a limit of 1
million New Zealand dollars (NZD; about
USD 600,000) per depositor (Treasury
2008a).3

Notable Features

The program was opt-in
New Zealand had no prior
deposit guarantee program,
and it did not retain deposit
insurance after this program
expired

Eligible institutions needed to be New
Zealand-registered banks and nonbank
deposit-taking
financial
institutions,
including building societies, credit unions,
and deposit-taking finance companies
(Reserve Bank 2008c). To be eligible for the
Scheme, institutions needed to submit an
application to the Treasury, which
determined an institution’s eligibility
(Reserve Bank 2008a; Reserve Bank
2009a; Reserve Bank 2009b; OAG 2011).

New Zealand’s program was
unusual in covering deposits in
nonbank financial institutions
and some types of collective
investment schemes
The Scheme began with flatrate fees, but later moved to a
risk-based fee
The program ultimately paid
100% of deposits, including
those above the cap

In 2009, the Parliament passed the Crown
Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme Act of
2009 to extend the Scheme (CRDGS Act
2009, pt. 2). That legislation had three main functions. First, it extended the Scheme until
December 31, 2011 (CRDGS Act 2009, pt. 2[6][1]). Second, it further specified which
institutions were eligible for the Scheme and provided a new application (English 2009; OAG
2011). Third, it allowed the Treasury to alter fees from a flat rate to a risk-based rate (CRDGS
Act 2009, pt. 2[6][2]; OAG 2011).
The Scheme covered all deposits for registered banks (Reserve Bank 2008c). For nonbank
deposit-taking institutions, the Scheme only covered the deposits of New Zealand citizens
and tax residents (Reserve Bank 2008c). The government originally said the guarantee
would be unlimited; on October 22, it set a cap of NZD 1 million per person (OAG 2011;
Reserve Bank 2008b). After October 12, 2010, the Scheme’s coverage was lowered to NZD
500,000 per person for bank accounts and NZD 250,000 for nonbank accounts (OAG 2011).
Originally, the Scheme was free for eligible institutions with total retail deposits under NZD
5 billion (Reserve Bank 2008d). For institutions with over NZD 5 billion of total retail
deposits, the Treasury charged 10 basis points on an institution’s total retail deposits over
NZD 5 billion (Reserve Bank 2008c). After October 12, 2010, fees for the Scheme became
risk-based and differed depending on the type of institution that was insured (OAG 2011).
The Treasury adopted risk-based fees because it believed that this would reduce market
distortion, favor lower-risk institutions, and encourage institutions to opt out of the Scheme
(OAG 2011; Treasury 2009c).
The government originally said the Scheme would last two years, until October 12, 2010
(Reserve Bank 2008d). However, in order to maintain public confidence, reduce market
3

On Oct. 15, 2008, USD 1 = NZD 1.67, per Yahoo Finance.
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distortion, and manage costs, the Scheme was extended in 2009 (Treasury 2009b; English
2009; CRDGS Act 2009). The Scheme ended on December 31, 2011 (Treasury 2012). Figure
1 highlights features of the Scheme and their changes over time.

476

New Zealand

Vergara

Figure 1: Comparing the Original, Revised, and Extended Phases of the Scheme
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Note: All figures are in NZD.
* Number of institutions covered when the Scheme started.
** A large proportion of deposits in failed entities covered by the revised guarantee deed continued to be
covered by the original guarantee deed (which was the deed in place when the deposit was made).
Source: OAG 2011, 78-79.

At its peak, the Scheme covered NZD 133 billion of deposits (Treasury 2011). A government
report noted that this was two-thirds of New Zealand’s annual gross domestic product and
nearly double the expenditures of New Zealand’s government (OAG 2011). During its
operation, no banks failed, but nine finance companies failed (OAG 2011). Eight were
covered by the original revised scheme and one (Equitable Mortgages) was covered by the
Extended Scheme. Figure 2 illustrates the failures that occurred during the Scheme’s
operation.
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Figure 2: Institutions That Failed While Covered by the Crown Retail Deposit
Guarantee Scheme

(a) All figures are in NZD.
(b) Original source was the New Zealand Treasury.
(c) As of June 30, 2011. The Treasury expects to pay out a further NZD 37.3 million.
* Includes interest payments after the institution failed and ineligible deposits. Note that some small payments
remain outstanding because some deposits are yet to mature, and some depositors cannot be traced.
** Most eligible depositors were paid on June 4, 2009.
Source: OAG 2011, 116.

The Scheme was expected to pay NZD 1.9 billion in claims due to these failures, the largest
being the failure of South Canterbury Finance Limited in August 2010 (OAG 2011). The
failure of South Canterbury Finance prompted the Treasury to pay out all depositors with
the finance company, regardless of their eligibility criteria (OAG 2011). The Treasury later
extended its decision to pay out all previously ineligible depositors to all other guaranteed
companies that failed (OAG 2011).
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The Scheme expected to collect NZD 1.1 billion from all its receiverships and NZD 237 million
in fees (Makhlouf 2010; OAG 2011).
Summary Evaluation
A report on the Scheme issued by New Zealand’s Auditor-General highlighted strengths and
weaknesses of the Scheme. The Auditor-General underscored the Treasury’s regular
communication about the Scheme, both with the public and with New Zealand’s government
(OAG 2011). However, the Auditor-General found that the Treasury’s monitoring of
participating institutions was imperfect and faced difficulties, including data inaccuracies
and delays in receiving information. It criticized the five-month gap between the launch of
the program and the first inspection of a covered institution. Still, the OAG said that the
monitoring that the Treasury eventually implemented was, “for the most part, effective”
(OAG 2011).
The Scheme faced several challenges. Foremost among these challenges was the speed with
which the Scheme needed to be designed and implemented (OAG 2011). Because there was
no deposit insurance scheme beforehand, the Treasury undertook a massive operation with
limited time to consider the Scheme’s design (OAG 2011). This led to various problems,
including limited planning for potential payouts of the guarantee (OAG 2011). Moreover,
questions were left open, such as whether the Scheme would cover interest accrued on
insured accounts (OAG 2011).
Another concern associated with the Scheme was market distortion (OAG 2011). The
Auditor-General’s report found that because financial institutions were insured under the
Scheme, these institutions experienced an influx of deposits, which increased the Scheme’s
risk exposure (OAG 2011). This provided financial institutions with an incentive to “engage
in higher-risk lending,” given that they were insured and received an influx of deposits (OAG
2011). Figure 3 illustrates these market distortions.
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Figure 3: Growth in Retail Deposits with Finance Companies Before and After the
Scheme Was Introduced

Note: Graph depicts growth in NZD.
Source: OAG 2011, 74.

The Treasury attempted to reduce this exposure over time. Namely, the Treasury revised the
Scheme under the Crown Retail Deposit Scheme Act, increasing fees and altering eligibility
criteria, so as to facilitate an orderly exit from the Scheme and to reduce market distortion
(OAG 2011).
In his report, the Auditor-General examined the Scheme’s first failure, that of Mascot Finance
Limited (OAG 2011). The Auditor-General noted that neither the Reserve Bank nor the
Treasury investigated information that could have affected Mascot Finance’s eligibility for
the Scheme (OAG 2011). While not opposing Mascot Finance’s entry in the Scheme, the
Auditor-General said that New Zealand authorities should have requested more information
regarding Mascot Finance’s liquidity position, to confirm its ability to meet its thenupcoming debt obligations (OAG 2011). Following Mascot Finance’s failure, the Auditor-
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General reported that the Treasury started to consider the riskiness of institutions, along
with their creditworthiness and business practices (OAG 2011). This led authorities to reject
several institutions from the Scheme (OAG 2011). The Auditor-General also noted that,
following the Scheme’s first failure, the Treasury became more concerned with minimizing
the Scheme’s cost, increasing the monitoring of individual institutions (OAG 2011).
The Auditor-General’s 2011 report made four recommendations to improve future
programs like the Scheme. First, the Auditor-General recommended that the Treasury should
have a project planning framework which would guide individuals implementing the
program (OAG 2011). Second, the Auditor-General suggested that the Treasury should have
a framework to clearly document important design decisions, while also being adaptable to
emerging risk (OAG 2011). Third, it suggested that the Treasury should conduct an internal
review of the Scheme (OAG 2011). Fourth, the Auditor-General proposed that the Treasury
and the Reserve Bank examine failed institutions and create a procedure to deal with such
institutions (OAG 2011).
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Context: New Zealand 2008–2011
$135.51 billion in 2008
GDP
$122.09 billion in 2009
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
$145.48 billion in 2010
converted to USD)
$166.27 billion in 2011
$31,253 in 2008
GDP per capita
$28,209 in 2009
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
$33,677 in 2010
converted to USD)
$38,388 in 2011
Data for 2008–2010:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

Size of banking system

Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system

Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance

Data for 2011:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AA+
Fitch: AA+
$195.93 billion in 2008
$183.86 billion in 2009
$223.25 billion in 2010
Data not available for 2011
144.59% in 2008
150.59% in 2009
153.46% in 2010
Data not available for 2011
100% in 2008–2010
Data not available for 2011
94.77% in 2008
95.26% in 2009
94.14% in 2010
93.60% in 2011
96% in 2008
96% in 2009
95% in 2010
95% in 2011
Data not available for 2008–2011
None (other than this program) in
2008–2011

Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The Crown Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme (the Scheme) guaranteed
all retail deposits and some managed funds to reassure depositors and to prevent
an outflow of funds to Australia.
In the aftermath of the failure of Lehman Brothers, the G-7 countries agreed to maintain
sound deposit insurance systems (Group of Seven 2008). At the time, New Zealand had no
deposit insurance scheme (Clark 2008). However, when Australian authorities informed
New Zealand that Australia would guarantee deposits, New Zealand officials on October 12,
2008, announced what they believed to be a similar scheme (OAG 2011; Reserve Bank
2008d). The Scheme was meant to reassure depositors and avoid a flight of funds to Australia
(OAG 2011; Reserve Bank 2008d).
However, New Zealand officials misunderstood the terms of Australia’s guarantee. They
believed that Australia’s guarantee would cover nonbank financial institutions as a “full
guarantee” (Dann 2018). The Australian guarantee did not cover these institutions.
2. Part of a Package: New Zealand policymakers also implemented a Wholesale
Funding Guarantee.
In addition to the Scheme, on November 1, 2008, the Treasury announced the Wholesale
Funding Guarantee (Treasury 2010a). The Wholesale Funding Guarantee was a “facility [for]
investment-grade financial institutions in New Zealand,” meant to help banks issue shortterm debt on wholesale funding markets and preserve the domestic economy’s access to
foreign credit (Cullen 2008; Fang 2020). This program was meant to facilitate access to
international funding markets after similar guarantees were announced in other countries,
including Australia (Cullen 2008; Treasury 2008b) (see Fang 2020). Australia and other
countries had announced deposit insurance and wholesale funding guarantees at the same
time.
3. Legal Authority: To establish the Scheme, New Zealand authorities utilized the
Public Finance Act of 1989. Later, the legislature extended the Scheme with the
Crown Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme Act.
When the Scheme was established, Parliament was not sitting; the Minister of Finance, who
heads the Department of the Treasury, was thus forced to act pursuant to his legal powers
(Reserve Bank 2008b). As such, the Scheme was established pursuant to the Public Finance
Act of 1989 (Reserve Bank 2008d; Public Finance Act 1989, sec. 65ZD). According to section
65ZD, the Minister of Finance can guarantee accounts if it is “necessary or expedient in the
public interest to do so” (Public Finance Act 1989, sec. 65ZD). Later, the Parliament passed
the Crown Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme Act of 2009 to extend the Scheme until
December 31, 2011, alter fees, and tighten eligibility criteria (CRDGS Act 2009, pt. 2[6][1]).
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4. Administration: The Treasury and the Reserve Bank drafted the Scheme. The
Treasury administered the day-to-day operations of the Scheme.
The Treasury and the Reserve Bank were both involved in designing the Scheme (OAG 2011).
The Treasury, though, was responsible for administering the day-to-day operations of the
Scheme, including monitoring accepted institutions (OAG 2011). Such monitoring, though,
only began in March 2009 (OAG 2011).
To enroll in the Scheme, institutions needed to apply (OAG 2011). The Treasury would then
determine whether an institution was eligible for the Scheme (OAG 2011). In cases where
participating institutions were unable to fulfill redemptions, the Treasury executed the
guarantee, acting as the institution’s insurer and receiver (Reserve Bank 2008c).
The Treasury contracted the Reserve Bank to monitor financial institutions and to advise the
Treasury on whether certain institutions met the Scheme’s eligibility criteria (OAG 2011).
The Treasury could appoint inspectors to validate monitoring information (OAG 2011).
5. Governance: The Reserve Bank aided the Treasury with prudential monitoring.
The Auditor-General later audited the Scheme.
In 2011, the Office of the Auditor-General conducted an evaluation of the Scheme, pursuant
to section 16 of the Public Audit Act of 2001 (OAG 2011; Public Audit Act 2001). The Office
of the Auditor-General reported that the Scheme had achieved its goal—no banks failed—
but faced several challenges (OAG 2011). As such, the Auditor-General provided the
Treasury and the Reserve Bank with policy recommendations (OAG 2011). See the
Evaluation section for a discussion of the Auditor-General’s report.
6. Communication: The Treasury asserted that the Scheme was meant to reassure
depositors during a time of economic uncertainty.
Leading up to October 12, 2008, New Zealand officials had been in communication with their
Australian counterparts, discussing whether guarantee schemes would be required in each
jurisdiction (OAG 2011). On October 12, 2008, Australian officials informed those in New
Zealand that a deposit insurance scheme would be announced (OAG 2011). This prompted
the New Zealand Treasury, on October 12, 2008, to announce the Scheme (Reserve Bank
2008d).
The Scheme was meant “to ensure ongoing retail depositor confidence in New Zealand’s
financial system, given turbulence in the international financial system” (Treasury 2009a).
The Auditor-General underscored the Treasury’s “adequate and timely” communication
about the Scheme, both with the public and with New Zealand’s government (OAG 2011).
The Auditor-General commended how updates to the Scheme were made available on the
Treasury’s website and how information was communicated to Parliament (OAG 2011).
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7. Size of Guarantees: The government first announced unlimited coverage, but two
weeks later set a cap of NZD 1 million; it lowered the cap in 2010.
In its October 12, 2008, announcement, the government said that it would provide unlimited
coverage to depositors. On October 22, 2008, it announced a cap of NZD 1 million per person
in line with a cap of AUD 1 million that it expected the Australian Government to announce;
two days later, the Australians did set a cap, but they also continued to offer unlimited
deposit coverage for a fee (Reserve Bank 2008b; OAG 2011; Treasury 2008a).
On October 12, 2010, the government lowered the cap to NZD 500,000 for bank accounts
and NZD 250,000 for nonbank accounts (OAG 2011).
8. Source(s) and Size of Funding: The Scheme was funded through fees charged to
eligible institutions, with the Treasury responsible for any losses in excess of the
fees.
The Scheme was funded by fees charged to participating institutions (Reserve Bank 2008b).
The Scheme collected NZD 237 million in fees (OAG 2011). The Scheme, though, was forced
to pay NZD 1.9 billion in claims, which was covered by the Treasury (OAG 2011; Makhlouf
2010). The Scheme expected to collect NZD 1.1 billion from receiverships. To cover the
expected loss, the Treasury set aside NZD 831 million in its fiscal budget for the year ended
June 30, 2009 (Treasury 2009d). The Scheme had collected NZD 237 million in fees as of June
30, 2010 (Makhlouf 2010; OAG 2011). The Scheme was not intended to minimize the
Crown’s liabilities (OAG 2011).
9. Eligible Institutions: At first, all New Zealand-registered banks and nonbank
deposit-taking financial institutions could apply to the Scheme. In 2009, the
government added a BB minimum credit rating.
Only deposit-taking institutions were eligible for the Scheme (Reserve Bank 2008d). Eligible
institutions needed to be New Zealand-registered banks and nonbank deposit-taking
financial institutions, which were fully compliant with the requirements of their trust deeds
(Reserve Bank 2008c).4 This included finance companies or companies that are oftentimes
involved in diverse forms of lending such as “motor vehicle and vendor finance, property
development, and commercial and consumer finance” (OAG 2011). Nonbank deposit-taking
institutions were also subject to a different regulatory and supervisory framework, when
compared to banks (OAG 2011). Nine eligible institutions failed under the Scheme, all of
them finance companies (OAG 2011). The Crown Retail Deposit Scheme Act of 2009 further
specified the criteria for eligible institutions (English 2009).

“Trust deeds” refers to the fact that New Zealand’s regulatory framework was based primarily on “a trustee
supervisory model under which an NBDT appoints a trustee corporation or person approved for the purpose”
(OAG 2011). According to this model, the nonbank deposit-taking institutions (NBDTs) would agree to a trust
deed, which set out requirements that the institution needed to meet (OAG 2011). The trustee was meant to
supervise and enforce the institution’s compliance with the terms of the trust deed (OAG 2011). The trustee
could also place the institution into receivership if this was a term of the trust deed (OAG 2011).
4
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The Scheme had different eligibility criteria for different types of institutions. It had five
different guarantee deeds: for registered banks; building societies and credit unions; and
three separate nonbank deposit-taking company guarantee deeds covering finance
companies, cash collective investment schemes, and unit trust collective investment
schemes (OAG 2011; Reserve Bank 2009a; Reserve Bank 2009b).
To participate in the Scheme, institutions were required to submit an application (OAG
2011). The application included a profile of an institution’s financial services, the value of
outstanding debt securities, and copies of the institution’s latest annual report, prospectus,
and investment statement (Treasury 2010b). The Treasury would then determine whether
an institution was eligible for the Scheme (OAG 2011). The application process led to some
confusion, as institutions were unclear about “other factors,” which the Treasury considered
in their decision to extend the guarantee (OAG 2011).
The Crown Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme Act of 2009 further clarified the eligibility
criteria for the Scheme, while also extending the Scheme and altering its fees (CRDGS Act
2009, pt. 2[5][1-3]; English 2009). Notably, the Act allowed the Minister of Finance to specify
eligibility criteria, like compliance with trust deeds and meeting the Reserve Bank’s
prudential requirements (OAG 2011). Collective investment schemes were no longer
eligible. The criteria also required eligible institutions to have a credit rating of BB or better.
At its peak, the Scheme covered 96 institutions (OAG 2011). Sixty of these were nonbank
deposit-taking institutions, 12 were banks, and 24 were collective investment schemes (OAG
2011). Figure 4 summarizes the number of institutions who applied over the Scheme’s
lifetime and whether they were approved, rejected, or withdrawn.
Figure 4: Institution Type and Their Acceptance Status over the Lifetime of the Scheme
Banks

Applications
accepted

Nonbank deposit Collective
taking
investment
institutions
schemes
12

60

All
institutions
24

96

Applications
rejected

0 Not available

Not available

15

Applications
withdrawn

0 Not available

Not available

31

Total
applications

12

85

Source: OAG 2011, 56.
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Those who opted out of the Scheme when it was extended no longer had coverage after
October 12, 2010 (OAG 2011). When the Scheme was extended with legislation, only eight
institutions—all nonbank deposit-taking institutions—participated in the Scheme, with
other institutions opting out (OAG 2011). The Auditor-General suggested that institutions
opted out because of the Scheme’s costs, because such institutions were doing well, or
because they no longer met the revised criteria, particularly the minimum BB credit rating
(OAG 2011). Figure 5 showcases which institutions participated in the Extended Scheme,
along with their outcomes.
Figure 5: Institutions Approved to Join the Extended Scheme

Source: OAG 2011, 85.
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10. Eligible Accounts: The Treasury covered all deposits for registered banks. For
nonbank deposit-taking institutions, the Scheme only covered the deposits of New
Zealand citizens and tax residents.
The Scheme covered all deposits for registered banks (Reserve Bank 2008c). For nonbank
deposit-taking institutions, the Scheme only covered the deposits of New Zealand citizens
and tax residents (Reserve Bank 2008c). The Treasury decided to insure nonbanks because
they believed that excluding nonbanks would prompt depositors to migrate their funds to
banks (OAG 2011). The Treasury held that this migration might cause a failure in nonbank
deposit-taking institutions (OAG 2011). To abate this fear, the Scheme covered nonbank
deposit-taking institutions that were viewed as riskier (OAG 2011). Moreover, the Scheme
covered interest accrued on insured accounts for failures that occurred prior to October 12,
2010 (OAG 2011). At first, the Scheme also covered collective investment schemes, or
investment products where a manager invests money on behalf of many investors (OAG
2011).
11. Fees: Participating institutions were initially charged a flat rate of 10 basis points
on total retail deposits over NZD 5 billion until a risk-based rate, which varied
according to the type of institution, was adopted on October 12, 2010.
From October 12, 2008, to October 12, 2010, the Scheme was free for eligible institutions
with total retail deposits under NZD 5 billion (Reserve Bank 2008d). For institutions with
over NZD 5 billion of total retail deposits, the Treasury charged 10 basis points on an
institution’s total retail deposits over NZD 5 billion (Reserve Bank 2008c). After October 12,
2010, fees for the Scheme became risk-based, depending on factors like an institution’s
outstanding debt securities, prospectus, investment statement, and compliance with
prudential requirements (OAG 2011). Fees also differed depending on the type of institution
that was insured, with nonbank deposit-taking institutions paying a higher fee to reflect their
riskiness and to reduce market distortion (OAG 2011). The Treasury adopted risk-based fees
because it believed that this would reduce market distortion, favor lower-risk institutions,
and encourage institutions to opt out of the Scheme (OAG 2011). For more details on these
fees, see Appendix 1.
The Treasury also reserved the right to impose a “new business” fee (OAG 2011). This was a
risk-based fee, determined by an institution’s credit rating, that applied to institutions whose
balances grew by more than 10% per year (OAG 2011; Treasury 2008a).
On October 22, 2008, the Treasury announced a 300-basis-point fee paid by nonbank
deposit-taking institutions that were rated below a BB or were unrated (Treasury 2008a).
As an incentive to increase their credit rating, institutions that achieved a BB rating or above
during the duration of the Scheme would be eligible for a rebate, which would give an
effective fee of 100 basis points for the period that an institution was below a BB (Treasury
2008a).
12. Process for Exercising Guarantee: If a participating institution failed, the Treasury
would cover all eligible deposit liabilities. Then, the Treasury would liquidate the
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institution’s remaining assets. The Treasury ultimately decided to pay out
ineligible depositors as well.
If an institution were to fail, the Treasury was required to inform the Minister of Finance and
his press secretary, who would communicate the failure to Parliament and to any members
of Parliament whose constituency was concentrated in the failed institution (OAG 2011).
In the case where a participating institution failed, the Treasury would pay out the
institution’s deposit liabilities, including interest accrued on insured accounts (Reserve Bank
2008c; OAG 2011). Then, the Treasury would liquidate the institution’s assets, with proceeds
from the Treasury’s receivership reimbursing the Scheme (Makhlouf 2010; OAG 2011). The
Treasury also had the power to withdraw its guarantee at any time (OAG 2011). The
Treasury withdrew its guarantee three times. One of these institutions, Viaduct Capital, later
failed. In that case, the Treasury initially paid deposits made prior to the withdrawal of the
guarantee (OAG 2011).
New Zealand’s Auditor-General report found that the Treasury was largely unprepared to
exercise the guarantee—only planning for the payout process a week before the Scheme’s
first failure (OAG 2011). This unpreparedness, though, allowed the Treasury to establish a
“robust and scalable” payout system (OAG 2011). Ultimately, this led the Treasury to adopt
an outsourcing arrangement to process claims (OAG 2011). The Treasury maintained
oversight over the outsourced payment-processing system (OAG 2011).
The Treasury could only execute the Scheme once an institution failed, not if the Treasury
suspected that an institution would fail (OAG 2011). The Treasury believed that executing
the Scheme once an institution failed was “more desirable and less costly than intervening
before a failure” (OAG 2011).
This was the case with South Canterbury Finance, the largest institution to fail under the
Scheme (OAG 2011). The Treasury, in this case, had ample warning about South Canterbury’s
impending failure, leading the Treasury to examine different payout methods (OAG 2011).
In the case of South Canterbury Finance, the Treasury paid all depositors, regardless of
eligibility criteria, due to the administrative task of determining eligibility for such a large
institution and concerns about the interest that would accrue as payments were processed.
The Treasury also paid other creditors of South Canterbury Finance whose claims ranked
higher than depositors (OAG 2011).
Ultimately, the decision to pay out all depositors, even ineligible depositors, was also
extended to institutions that had failed prior to South Canterbury Finance (OAG 2011).
13. Other Restrictions on Eligible Institutions or Accounts: Scheme participants were
subject to increased monitoring. The Treasury imposed additional restrictions on
nonbanks, including restrictions on distributions to shareholders.
Through the Scheme, the Treasury had expanded powers, including the ability to request
information from participating institutions and to withdraw its guarantee (OAG 2011).
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The government imposed additional restrictions on nonbank deposit-takers participating in
the guarantee, including restrictions on distributions to shareholders; assurance that their
business dealings were on arm’s-length terms; and the government’s ability to appoint an
inspector (Treasury 2009d).
14. Duration: The Scheme was initially meant to last until October 12, 2010, but was
ultimately extended until December 31, 2011.
Originally, the Scheme was intended to last two years, until October 12, 2010—a period
during which the government planned to “see how well international financial markets
[stabilized]” (Reserve Bank 2008d). However, in order to maintain public confidence in the
New Zealand banking and financial system, to minimize market distortions, and to minimize
costs, the Scheme was extended in 2009 (Treasury 2009b; CRDGS Act 2009, pt. 2[6][1]). The
Scheme was then scheduled to end on December 31, 2011 (CRDGS Act 2009, pt. 2[6][1]).
Many institutions opted out of the Scheme because of its costs, because such institutions
were doing well, or because they no longer met the revised criteria, particularly the
minimum BB credit rating (OAG 2011). Only eight institutions participated in the Extended
Scheme (OAG 2011). The Scheme ended as scheduled on December 31, 2011 (Treasury
2012).
As of mid-2022, New Zealand was working to create a standing deposit insurance scheme,
which would guarantee NZD 100,000, or 93% of depositors (Robertson 2021). New Zealand
authorities hoped to have the scheme operational in 2023 (Robertson 2021).
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Appendix
Figure 1: Fees Charged for the Original, Revised, and Extended Phases of the Scheme

(a) All figures are in NZD.
(b) A basis point is one hundredth of a percentage point (0.01%). This means that a bank with an A+ credit
rating and NZD 7 billion in deposits guaranteed under the original Scheme would pay fees of 0.1% of NZD
2 billion each year, or NZD 2 million.
Source: OAG 2011, 82.
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